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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to shed light into money laundering using bitcoin. Digital payment methods are
increasingly used by criminals to launder money obtained through cybercrime. As many forms of cybercrime
are motivated by proﬁt, a solid cash-out strategy is required to ensure that crime proceeds end up with the
criminals themselves without an incriminating money trail. The authors examine how cybercrime proceeds
can be laundered using services that are offered on the DarkWeb.
Design/methodology/approach – Focusing on service-percentages and reputation-mechanisms in
underground bitcoin laundering services, this paper presents the results of a cash-out experiment in which
ﬁve mixing and ﬁve exchange services are included.
Findings – Some of the examined services provide an excellent, professional and well-reviewed service
at competitive cost. Whereas others turned out to be scams, accepting bitcoin but returning nothing in
return.
Practical implications – The authors discuss what these ﬁndings mean to law enforcement, and how
bitcoin laundering chains could be disrupted.
Originality/value – These cash-out strategies are increasingly facilitated by cryptocurrencies,
mainly bitcoin. Bitcoins are already relatively anonymous, but with the rise of specialised bitcoin money
laundering services on the Dark Web, laundering money in the form of bitcoins becomes available to a
wider audience.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, cryptocurrencies – like bitcoin – are commonly used in a variety of cybercrimes.
Bitcoins are used in both:
(1) cyber enabled crime, i.e. crimes that are enabled by computers and the Internet
(such as hacking and malware); and
(2) cyber assisted crime, i.e. criminal behaviours in which computers and the Internet
assist in committing crimes (such as drug trade on online forums) (McQuade, 2002;
Burden and Palmer, 2003).
In both types of cybercrime, bitcoin can be seen as an enabler of the digital criminal
enterprise. The main instigators of their popularity among cybercriminals is that they are
straightforward to use, relatively anonymous, and their use is unimpeded by borders or
legislation (Shcherbak, 2013; Bryans, 2014). Steadily, bitcoin has proven itself to be a vital
part of the criminal enterprises. For instance, ransomware victims are pressed to exchange
the ransom from ﬁat currency to bitcoin and transfer this amount to a speciﬁc bitcoin
address that is provided by the criminals. On underground markets, large amounts of goods
and services – like drugs, weapons and DDoS-attacks – are bought and sold using bitcoin as
method of payment. In online underground markets, bitcoins are therefore to be seen as the
preferred currency of criminals (Motoyama et al., 2011; Sood et al., 2013; Moore and Rid,
2016). And recently, criminals start to embrace bitcoin as a partner in their cash-out strategy
and launder money aided by bitcoin (Möser et al., 2013).
Criminals need a solid cash-out strategy to launder cybercrime proceeds, in this case
bitcoin, without getting connected to the associated crime (Levi, 2015). A cybercriminal
seldom starts his cash-out with bitcoins. Usually, his cybercrime proceeds exist of ﬁat
currency, such as euros or dollars. Regardless of the source, nature and size of the
cybercrime proceeds, the bitcoin ecosystem is used as part of the anonymisation or layering
process a cash-out strategy entails. Already upon exchanging these proceeds for bitcoin, the
money trail becomes obfuscated (Europol, 2015c).
On the Dark Web, services are being offered to anonymize bitcoins even further, by
mixing them, or in this case – launder them. Two key components in this “bitcoin
laundering” are bitcoin mixers and bitcoin exchanges (Moore and Christin, 2013; Möser
et al., 2013; Christopher, 2014; Brenig et al., 2015). Bitcoin mixing services are services that
aim to disassociate bitcoins from their often-criminal source. Bitcoin exchange services are
services that aim to anonymously convert bitcoins to spendable money. In this paper, we
focus on the use of the cryptocurrency bitcoin facilitating the cash-out and laundering of
cybercrime proceeds.
Until now, there is little experimental, empirical research into the working of these
bitcoins mixers, let alone explorative research into its usability for cash-out strategies. Only
Möser et al. (2013) tested ﬁve bitcoin mixers to analyse their technical method of operation.
But how do you identify and select a reputable service? And what percentage of your crime
proceeds do you “lose” in the laundering process? To answer those and similar questions, we
set-up an experiment that in addition to testing the mixers itself, illustrates a cash-out
strategy using bitcoin mixers. The experiment will allow us to further determine the
likeliness of integration of these potential criminal strategies in an actual criminal scheme.
Doing so, we were able to analyse these cash-out strategies, as it would provide an
opportunity to study how the different elements of such a strategy are connectable and how
they operate together as a (successful) cash-out strategy.
The goal of this paper is not only to test the method of operation of bitcoin mixers but
also to make a ﬁrst attempt to identify the usability of these mixers in a cash-out strategy.
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Understanding the strengths and weaknesses in this strategy, will enable creating better
evidence-based countermeasures for money laundering, ideally corrupting the underlying
business models. The question we attempt to answer is: To what extent are those bitcoin
mixing- and exchange services being offered on the DarkWeb reputable and cost-efﬁcient to
be used in a money laundering scheme?
The remainder of this paper is divided in ﬁve sections. Section 2 provides an overview of
money laundering, related to bitcoin and underground markets. Section 3 considers bitcoins
and bitcoin laundering as a part of a cybercrime cash-out strategy. The approach and
methodology of the underlying experiment are outlined in Section 4. The results of the
experiment are presented in Section 5. Finally, we present our conclusion and implications
thereof for both law enforcement efforts as for the policies on cryptocurrencies in Section 6.
2. Money laundering, bitcoin and underground markets
Money laundering is not a new criminal phenomenon. It is a constantly changing criminal
phenomenon, with updated modus operandi and evolving business models (Savona, 2014).
To the criminal enterprise, a decent cash-out strategy is not easy to achieve. Crime proceeds
without the means to launder these proceeds, would make the criminal business an
unproﬁtable one, unless it is carried out purely for lifestyle expenditure. Traditionally, the
laundering of crime money is facilitated by money mules, offshore accounts, or luxuries
products, i.e. art, houses, boats, or a combination of those (Levi and Reuter, 2006; Aston et al.,
2009; Florencio and Herley, 2010; Levi, 2015). Alternative payment methods, such as
Western Union or Perfect Money, allegedly have a prominent place in money laundering
schemes. Prepaid credit cards, gift vouchers or other easily exchangeable non-traditional
value items are also often associated with the laundering of crime money[1]. Today, so called
new-payment methods are becoming a more important factor in actual money laundering
schemes (Europol, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; FATF, 2015). Within the category of new-payments
methods, cryptocurrencies stand out. A shift is apparent, in which criminals more frequently
make use of cryptocurrencies in the cash-out of crime proceeds (FATF, 2015). Bitcoins are
also a popular form of payment between criminals. Europol (2015b, p. 46) even reports that
bitcoin is “accounting for over 40 per cent of all identiﬁed criminal-to-criminal payments” in
cybercrime investigations. The extent to which this can be seen as evidence that there is an
inﬂux in the use of bitcoin as the prominent “criminal” payment method, remains to be seen.
Underground markets can be seen as a facilitator for using cryptocurrencies in current
and future money laundering schemes. These undergroundmarkets are easily accessible and
are gaining popularity amongst (cyber)criminals to deploy and set-up criminal activities.
Anonymous browsing has become available for the general public using the Tor-protocol
(the onion router). The Tor system routes internet trafﬁc to several Tor nodes, encrypting the
network trafﬁc in between (Dingledine et al., 2004). Only the IP-address of the previous Tor
node in a chain is visible to a connecting computer. Therefore, Tor makes it possible to use
the Internet without revealing the originating IP address of the computer that is used to
access the Internet by a computer user[2]. In this way the so-called Dark Web came into
existence, which attracts growing amounts of criminals seeking the advantages of moving
their activities to the Dark Web. Quantitative research on the Dark Web indicates that more
than 50 per cent of all content on the DarkWeb is illegal (Moore and Rid, 2016, p. 21).
Criminals set-up entire business models and create a whole new, online underground
economy (Christin, 2013; Holt, 2013; Holt and Smirnova, 2014). An underground economy
has emerged that is based on buying and selling criminal techniques and services on the
Internet (Holz et al., 2009; Motoyama et al., 2011). Criminals ﬂock to the platform, even those
that scam each other. “No honour amongst thieves”, as the saying goes. A review system –
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comparable with for instance eBay – is put in place to reduce this scamming risk (Décary-
Hétu and Dupont, 2013; Holt et al., 2015). This review system can be seen as the most
prominent element of the reputation-mechanism in underground markets, wherein services
are reviewed and ﬂagged as veriﬁed and working, a scam or to be cautious. An example of
existing, accumulated reviews can be found in the Figure 1 below.
Next, research indicates that these marketplaces are extensively used by criminals to buy
and offer illegal goods and services (Motoyama et al., 2011; Sood et al., 2013; Thomas et al.,
2015). Eeten and Bauer (2008) already indicated that a speciﬁc underground economy of
cybercrime has emerged, where individuals can buy and offer services that play a certain
function within a cybercrime scheme. For example, some criminals author the malicious
software that other individuals can use to infect computer and steal personal or ﬁnancial
information (Eeten and Bauer, 2008; Anderson et al., 2012). Many of that software is
subsequently offered as a “kit” on the Dark Web that individuals can buy or rent (Caballero
et al., 2011; Grier et al., 2012; Sood and Enbody, 2013). Other individuals specialize in
laundering the proceeds obtained through cybercrime by offering bitcoin mixing and
underground exchange services (Möser et al., 2013). Europol (2015a, p. 31) predicts that
“individuals with computer skills or other skill that are valuable to criminal organisations
are expected to advertise their services for payment in cryptocurrencies”.
The above supports the image that a majority of these marketplaces are involved with
criminal activity and that the use of bitcoin – as method of payment and facilitator for
money laundering – is popular among cybercriminals. Our research therefore aims to
provide insight in the process of money laundering by the use of the virtual currency and
their involvement in cash-out strategies used by criminals. Bitcoins are chosen as the virtual
currency of interest, because bitcoin is presumably the preferred cryptocurrency among
cybercriminals (Möser et al., 2014; Europol, 2015b). Yet, little is known about cash-out
strategies using bitcoins to launder crime proceeds that are obtained through cybercrime.
3. “Bitcoin money laundering”
We now shift to the characteristics of the bitcoin ecosystem, to make clear why and how
bitcoin facilitates the laundering of cybercrime proceeds. Blockchain is the fundament of
bitcoin. The bitcoin blockchain operates as a decentralized bank for the bitcoin
cryptocurrency (Nakamoto, 2008). This means banks are no longer necessary
in interpersonal transactions with bitcoins. As a result, bitcoin transactions are made
between bitcoin addresses directly (Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013). In this sense, the
blockchain can be seen as a publicly visible and veriﬁable ledger. All transactions are
logged in the blockchain and can be inspected via public websites, such as blockchain.info
and other open source websites. Anyone, anywhere, can see all bitcoin transactions from one
bitcoin address to another in real time. The current balance of the amount of bitcoins in a
bitcoin address is also visible in the blockchain. Despite its openness, the bitcoin system
does provide a high level of anonymity. The reason for this anonymity is that bitcoin
addresses are not registered to individuals, in contrast to bank accounts. Comparable with
numbered Swiss banking accounts, the bitcoin address itself acts as a unique identiﬁer and
the account is only accessible by the owner who has the login details to the bitcoin wallet.
Figure 1.
Example of gambling
site reviews including
accompanied labels
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Yet, no names are connected to the bitcoin address and wallet. In addition to its high degree
of anonymity, bitcoin relies on the instant creating of new bitcoin addresses. This in sharp
contrast to bank accounts, which take time to set-up, next to the obligatory registration of
personal information to name the account. This level of anonymity explains why bitcoin has
become so popular in illegal activities. The total system however – from a criminal
perspective – has one “downside”. Owing to the blockchain concept, all historic information
on any bitcoin address and transactional information is just one mouse-click away for law
enforcement authorities (UNODC, 2014).
Figure 2 illustrates the workings of the blockchain model for bitcoin transactions.
A bitcoin transaction constitutes of several elements: it has one or more inputs, one or
more outputs and holds the cryptographic protection of this information. Each input and
output consist of a bitcoin address and a bitcoin amount. As bitcoin transactions are linked
to each other, each input is automatically an output of a previous transaction. This way, the
value of a bitcoin output can be traced back to previous transactions.
Obviously, this poses a potential risk – from a criminal perspective – as the transaction
that is used to cash-out cybercrime proceeds, links back to transaction(s) that are associated
with illegal activity. For instance, transactions can potentially be linked to the receipt of
ransom, the selling of illegal goods or other cybercrimes. This risk is the instigator of
technologies designed to break the transnational link between the bitcoin transaction and
illegal activity. For that reason, bitcoin mixing services are created that aim to break the
transactional link – or in this case the money trail – of bitcoins[3]. Figure 3 illustrates the
working of a typical bitcoin mixer.
The typical mode of operation is that bitcoin mixing services provide customers with a
newly generated bitcoin address to make a deposit. The bitcoin mixing service pays out
other bitcoins from its reserve to bitcoin addresses provided by the customer, after
deducting a mixing fee. To provide more anonymity, the pay-outs are spread out over time
and some randomness is introduced in the division of amounts and/or the mixing fee.
An operational bitcoin mixer makes it virtually impossible to trace back mixed bitcoin to
their tainted source. The customer can check the taint of the received bitcoins at the
blockchain, e.g. at blockchain.info. If the bitcoin mixing is performed correctly, there is no
link (“zero per cent taint”) between the deposited bitcoins and the received bitcoins. Some
Figure 2.
A bitcoin transaction
has inputs and
outputs (a); bitcoin
transactions are
linked to each
other (b)
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bitcoin mixing services offer a service to returning customers to ensure that (earlier)
deposited tainted bitcoins in their reserve are not accidently paid out to the same customer
in a subsequent use of the mixing service. After each “mix” the customer is issued a
returning customer number. This number can be presented when reusing the mixing
service. The mixer then knows which bitcoins in the reserve were earlier deposited and will
not pay out these same bitcoins to the client. This service-model is suitable for returning
customers, or, said differently: frequent launderers. In this manner a sophisticated strategy
can be set-up, using bitcoin as a facilitator in laundering cybercrime proceeds. When
individuals successfully use a bitcoin mixer and subsequently an underground bitcoin
exchange, only mistakes will leave sparse traces to your true identity or the fruits of your
crime.
In summary, we have shown that the cryptocurrency bitcoin is used in many forms of
cybercrimes. We have also explained the rise in popularity of bitcoins amongst
cybercriminals. A potentially toxic combination – of anonymous browsing, trading, paying
and laundering – becomes apparent. To determine the extent to which bitcoin laundering is
feasible and – looking at reputation-mechanisms and service-percentage – actually usable in
the criminal enterprise, we set-up a bitcoin laundering experiment.
4. Approach
In this section, we ﬁrst lay down the approach to our experiment and used to get an
overview of both the available mixing and (underground) exchange services. We outline
their individual characteristics and the selection criteria for the underground services to be
included in the experiment. Thereafter, we elaborate on the set-up of the actual experiment,
describing our methodology step-by-step.
4.1 Set-up
To set-up the underlying experiment for this paper, we needed to address three conditional
methodological questions. First, how do we get an overview of both underground bitcoin
mixing and exchange services and its reputation and service-percentage. Second, how do we
select bitcoin mixing and exchange services for this experiment? And third, how do we
determine the effectiveness of these services?
Figure 3.
A bitcoin mixing
service were ‘tainted’
bitcoins are deposited
in the reserve of the
mixer, and
subsequently ‘clean’
bitcoins are paid out
to the customer
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4.1.1 Overview of available bitcoin mixing and exchange services. To gain insight into the
underground economy of bitcoin laundering services we made use of the TNO Dark Web
Monitor[4]. The TNO Dark Web Monitor makes use of a “crawling” technique to collect and
analyse data on the Dark Web. This system therefore provides a solid basis for both
exploratory and longitudinal research, as the data are collected over a longer period of time
and is independent of the hidden services that are still online. Using this technique, we have
discovered over 25,000 hidden services, i.e. Dark Web websites. By use of the TNO Dark
Web Monitor, we obtained a solid overview of the total supply of Dark Web services
offering bitcoin mixing and exchange from bitcoin to other non-virtual currency via a
diversity of anonymous output platforms. This overview enabled us to see a number of
notable differences in the offered services.
First, the analysis revealed that bitcoin mixers differentiate in service percentage,
registration and authentication process, reviews and time delay. The service percentage
relates to the percentage the service takes for mixing bitcoins. The registration and
authentication process relate to how you register for the process and whether there is any
form of authentication involved. The reviews relate to how the service is reviewed by other
users and the time delay regards the question how much time it takes to receive mixed
bitcoins.
Second, Bitcoin exchange services also differ in service percentage, registration and
authentication process, reviews and time delay. Importantly, exchange services also show a
variation in output platform. In other words, they offer, for instance, PayPal or Perfect
Money, to allow a client to anonymously receive the exchanged bitcoins. Keep in mind that
these payment services themselves often do not offer this type of service. Using a bitcoin
mixer and subsequently an underground bitcoin exchange service, make up together a cash-
out strategy for cybercriminals (see Figure 4). The aim of the cash-out strategy is to provide
the spendable proceeds of the crime that cannot be traced back to its origin.
4.1.2 Selection of services. Following the ﬁrst question, we addressed the second
question: how do we select the services to be included in our experiment. Starting from the
paper of Möser et al. (2013) and desk research into known mixers and exchange services, we
added the currently available mixers and underground exchanges and generated a list of
still active services. Owing to budget restraints, we settled on selecting ﬁve mixing services
and ﬁve exchange services[5]. The ﬁve services were selected on the basis of the three
criteria: function and fee, positive/negative reviews and (laundering/mixing) reputation in
general[6]. Note that we indeed purposively included negatively reviewed services, e.g.
potential scams, into our sample[7]. The selected mixing services can be categorized as
follows (see Table I).
By use of this sample, we belief we have selected these services that best reﬂect the total
population of services on the Dark Web. The sample covers a variation in reviews, namely,
from scams to veriﬁed services. In addition, this sample provides a differentiation in the
charged fee, namely, from nearly no fee up to more “expensive” services.
Figure 4.
Mixing services,
combined with
underground bitcoin
exchanges, from the
essential parts of the
cash-out strategy
Bitcoin money
laundering
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For the underground exchange services, however, no such well-documented and reviewed
overview of services was present. Therefore, we selected the underground exchanges that
we came across in our search for bitcoin mixing services and underlying desk research.
Now that we have answered the ﬁrst of two conditional questions, we can create the
following model depicting the process of the experiment (Figure 5)[8].
4.1.3 Testing the eﬀectiveness of the services. Third and ﬁnally, we had to decide how to
determine the effectiveness of the tested services. For the mixing services we stick with the
“product description” or “product promise” of many of these services: no taint. In that case,
no taint refers to the taint a transaction has between bitcoin addresses in the blockchain. As
the blockchain is easily accessible and a taint analysis is just one mouse-click away, we
assume that this is a solid identiﬁer for success and is also used or usable by cybercriminals
who want to assess the service on its operational excellence. The ﬁrst indicator for “success”
is the actual transferring of the bitcoins. Being scammed would count as unsuccessful. The
underground exchange services are only effective when the bitcoins are exchanged to ﬁat
currency and anonymously transferred to the output platform speciﬁed. In that case, both
the used service as the used output platform (such as Western Union and PayPal) needs to
be assessed. Again, success counts here as not being scammed.
4.2 Experiment
We operated the experiment on one day, to minimize both the loss of value in bitcoin owing
to ﬂuctuating currency exchange rates and moreover to test the speed and user-friendliness
of the total cash-out strategy. First, we bought the necessary bitcoin via the Dutch payment
service iDeal and started the experiment with these bitcoins stored in Wallet X on one
bitcoin address. Hence, this can be seen as our “control” address – where all the bitcoins
used in the experiment originate from. After this ﬁrst step, all the following steps are
Table I.
Overview of included
mixing services in
the experiment
Mixer Review Advertised fee (%)
Mixer 1 – 0.5-3.5
Mixer 2 Caution 2
Mixer 3 Scam 0.1
Mixer 4 Veriﬁed 1-3
Mixer 5 Veriﬁed 1-2.5
Figure 5.
Conceptual model of
the experiment
JFC
25,2
426
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
47
.1
81
.1
05
.1
0 
A
t 2
3:
04
 2
5 
Ju
ne
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
undertaken via the Tor-network to guarantee the most anonymous process. Second, we set-
up a Lelantos email-account – which is a form of Tor-mail – for possible future
communication with certain services. Third, we created Wallet Y, wherein we generate one
or more new, clean bitcoin address per mixing service depending on the variety of services
offered by the mixer. Fourth, we used all of the ﬁve selected mixing services one by one.
Nearly all following the procedure of a) transferring bitcoin to a new – by the mixer
provided – bitcoin address from our Wallet X and b) requesting the mixed coins to be
transferred to one or multiple bitcoin addresses in our Wallet Y. Fifth, after we conﬁrmed
the actual transferring of the (mixed) coins, we analysed the taint of the incoming
transaction by cross-checking the traceability to our “control address”. Sixth, we
consecutively used the ﬁve exchange services. Following a procedure comparable to the
mixing services of a) transferring bitcoin to a new – by the exchange service provided –
bitcoin address from our Wallet Y b) selecting the output platform and c) providing details
for this platform.
All these steps we could ﬁt in the time-span of one day. The actual cash-out however takes 1
to 3 days, depending upon the output platform used. However, we were able to “consume” one
output platform right away. Therefore, we used, without registering an account, the Dutch
online food ordering service Thuisbezorgd.nl to order Sushi and paid – of course – with mixed
bitcoins. A few days later, we were able to assess the success of the other exchange services
and thereby the entire cash-out. We cashed out our mixed bitcoins using the following ﬁve
service platforms: PayPal, PerfectMoney,Western Union, Bitonic and Thuisbezorgd.nl.
5. (Mixed) results
We present the results of the experiment in two ways. First, we show the results in terms of
bitcoin transferring by use of bitcoin mixing services. Second, we show the results of our
exchange services. Based on these results, we describe our overarching conclusions based
on the experiment and the overall cash-out strategy.
5.1 Mixing services
In this section, we show the results of our bitcoins transfers using ﬁve bitcoin mixing
services.
In Table II, we have plotted the results of the experiment for these ﬁve speciﬁc mixing
services.
Noticeably, we fell for a scam three out of ﬁve times. Resulting in an immediate loss of 2.5
BTC. In all of these three cases, the bitcoins were successfully transferred from our “control
address” to the bitcoin address the mixing services provided. Yet, we have not received any
of the bitcoins we provided to the addresses belonging to theMixers 1, 2 and 3.
Next, we used the Numisight blockchain explorer[9] to see what further information
we could extract on all the mixing services and what happened to the bitcoins that went
“missing”. We discovered that the deposit address for Mixer 1 had already been used in
Table II.
Output and taint of
mixing services
Mixing service BTC IN BTC OUT (%) Blockchain-taint (%)
Mixer 1 1.0 0 – –
Mixer 2 1.0 0 – –
Mixer 3 0.5 0 – –
Mixer 4 0.5 0.4931291 1.37 0
Mixer 5 0.5 0.497509 0.5 0
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a transaction three days before our experiment. Reuse of bitcoin addresses should be
considered a deadly sin in the world of bitcoin mixing, as it provides correlations that
could be used in forensic analysis[10]. Bear in mind that exactly these types
of correlations are the main reason of using a bitcoin mixer to begin with. In curious
contrast to this sole purpose, this mixer (willingly) made a mistake thereby annulling
our efforts to prevent just these types of correlations. The same deposit address of
Mixer 1 was used three more times during the next two weeks. We discovered a similar
pattern of bitcoin address reuse by Mixer 2. When looking more closely into the outputs
of Mixer 1 and Mixer 2, we discovered that they were combined in a transaction 12 days
after our experiment. All of this strongly suggests that Mixer 1 and Mixer 2 are closely
collaborating, and that they are very likely to be the same entity. This result, that Mixer
1 and Mixer 2 are closely collaborating and made use of the same bitcoin address at one
point, is visualised in Figure 6.
To have a complete picture, we performed the same analysis for Mixers 3, 4 and 5.
Mixers 3 and 4 each used their deposit address exactly once. Mixer 5 required the payment
of an entry fee at the bitcoin address that was also used as deposit address, but there was no
other bitcoin address reuse.
Another relevant result of the experiment regards to the question how long a deposit
remains unspent. This is an indication for how much time worth of reserve a bitcoin mixer
has. Or in other words, how large the reserve of a bitcoin mixer is in terms of the amount of
bitcoins available for future mixing. When having a large reserve, a bitcoin mixer is not
forced to reuse its deposits quickly as output in another “mix”. For Mixers 1, 2 and 3, the
wait time was four days (just after the weekend, as we operated the experiment on a Friday).
For Mixer 4, the wait time was 17 h. ForMixer 5, the wait time was 3 h.
Furthermore, two out of the ﬁve tested services, i.e. all of the successful mixing
attempts, operated conform to their own description. We received the same amount of
bitcoins that we transferred to the service minus the percentage for the use of this
service. Of both of these services, no taint is observable between the bitcoins we
received from the mixers on the addresses we speciﬁed and our bitcoin “control
address”[11]. This means that there is – in retrospect – no way of linking these two
addresses to each other, i.e. the money trail is obfuscated and, in all probability,
impossible to follow. So, despite the fact that we actually transferred bitcoins – via a
mixer – from Wallet X to Wallet Y no trail can be found that reconstructs that we did
precisely that.
Figure 6.
Blockchain analysis –
using Numisight –
strongly suggests
that Mixer 1 and
Mixer 2 are controlled
by the same entity
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5.2 Exchange services
In this section, we show the results of the use of ﬁve exchange services we used to cash-out
our mixed bitcoins.
In contrary to the mixing services, exchanges services are based on both a service and an
output platform. The service refers to the supplier that offers to receive bitcoin and will
exchange this to a currency of your choosing. An output platform, such as PayPal of
Western Union, is used to make sure this exchanged currency ends up in your
possession[12]. In Table III, we have plotted the results of the experiment for these ﬁve
individual services and the platform used by this service.
At ﬁrst glance, it is clear that all but one of the exchange services tested was operational
and successful in its promise to exchange our mixed coins for currency or food. Only the
service-platform combination that makes use of Perfect Money did not came through. This
could be because of the fact that the service is a scam or that the platform itself – Perfect
Money – has blocked the transaction[13]. Next, we used PayPal and Western Union as a
cash-out strategy. The platform that facilitated this transaction charged a high percentage
for the transfer. In exchange, we expected a better anonymization of this part of the cash-out
strategy. This turned out to be the case. To use PayPal as a cash-out strategy we needed to
provide a valid and active PayPal account, which can be bought online on underground
markets or generated without leaving anything more than an (Tor) e-mail address. As
promised, we received the exchanged funds on the PayPal account we provided. The
service-platform combination that used Western Union asked us to provide a name and
place for the collection of the funds. After we provided this information, we could pick-up
the exchanged funds at a Western Union ofﬁce of our choosing without leaving a signature.
When comparing both cash-out strategies, it is important to note that the method via PayPal
does not include a physical hand-over of the exchanged funds, where this is the case with the
Western Union method. This is why we rated the PayPal service-platform combination
slightly more anonymous than itsWestern Union alternative.
From a “criminal perspective”, we did make a vital mistake in our cash-out. Whereas
there was no link between our “tainted” bitcoins and “laundered” bitcoins at the day of the
experiment, we cleaned up the experiment and retrieved the invested bitcoins four days
later. In this clean-up, remaining “tainted” bitcoins and “laundered” bitcoins were sent to our
bitcoin address at a regular bitcoin exchange. This “mistake” linked our identity directly
back to the “tainted” bitcoins, negating all our previous efforts to stay anonymous. Of
course, this step was intentional – as the experiment was completed and remaining bitcoins
were to be collected – it does show how easily it is to make a mistake and render the
attempted launderer vulnerable.
Table III.
Overview of output
and anonymity of the
selected exchange
services
Exchange servicea BTC IN OUTb (%) Anonymous?
1/PayPal 0.233933 $52.42 6 þ
2/Perfect Money 0.1 0 6.9 ?
3/Western Union 1.220364 $197 10%þ $50 þ/
4/Bitonic 0.33740872 $71 0.25 –
Notes aNotwithstanding the fact that we choose not to name the used mixing services by name, a solid
overview of the results would be impossible without naming the output platforms as they have very
distinct procedures and regulations that make the analysis more in-depth and understandable; bBased on
currency rates on 29 to 31 May 2015
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5.3 Overarching results
In this section, we discuss the overarching results of our experiment. Our ﬁrst conclusion is
that bitcoin laundering services offered on the Dark Web are partly scams and partly
operational services. Reviews are of the utmost importance to reduce the chance of being
scammed. The trustworthiness of this review system is solidiﬁed in our experiment, because
the services that were ﬂagged “orange” or “red”, indicating to be cautious or be alarmed not
to use these services, actually corresponded with our three mixing service scams[14]. In
addition, the two operational mixing services were ranked “green” in reviews. This means
that if you read and use reviews of these speciﬁc services carefully, the risk of getting
scammed is minimized. It would be wise for criminals to use these review systems, as it
helps them to keep costs of scams low. The attractiveness of the examined type of case-out
strategy is clear, as these services work as advertised and were straightforward to use in an
anonymousmanner (as no taint was present in the blockchain).
The exchange services show us a different pattern. All exchange services operated as
they promised, except one. However, the level of anonymity differs a lot from service to
service and from platform to platform. The exchange Bitonic[15] connects the mixed coins
directly to a bank account, as this is required to use a regular bitcoin exchange. Of course, it
is not obligated and it would not be wise to provide your own bank account for an exchange.
A name and bank account number provide an interesting lead for law enforcement
authorities. Using output platforms which are often integrated in other cash-out and more
physically oriented laundering strategies, like PayPal and Western Union, build on an
already established reputation in that area. The examined exchange services allow their
clients to receive money in any shape and form with minimal registration requirement that
may lead back to the identity of individuals.
Finally, it is important to point out that mistakes are made easily in the examined cash-
out strategy. For instance:
 not using the Tor browser;
 using the same bitcoin address for different purposes; and
 providing an email address are detrimental to an anonymous transaction, are
possible mistakes.
This is however no different from other cash-out strategies, where mistakes also leave
(extra) traces for law enforcement authorities.
In our view, the most signiﬁcant difference compared to other money laundering
strategies is the total percentage that covers the costs of this particular cash-out strategy. In
many other cases these percentages add up to nearly 50 per cent. In this case, looking at the
maximum costs of all services and adjusting for potential value drops regarding exchange
rates, we can safely estimate the total percentage of costs will not exceed 15 per cent in this
speciﬁc cash-out strategy. Again, we thereby assess that the strategy itself pre-includes
trial-and-error and users reviews to ﬁnd and use operational mixing and exchange services.
Therefore, we do not contemplate the risk of getting scammed in our experiment as one to be
very cost-increasing in these strategies as the full-scale operation of the strategy will be built
on positively-reviewed operational services. Therefore, we conclude that 15 per cent is a
good estimate of the total cost of this type of cash-out strategy based on the underlying
experiment.
Keep in mind, however, that intermediary cash-out services may block transactions that
exceed a certain threshold, for instance $5,000 or $10,000. Therefore, it is not certain this
cash-out method works when larger amounts of money are laundered. Yet, potentially, the
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low commission of 15 per cent for laundering services may make it interesting for
cybercriminals to use bitcoins, mixing services and exchanges for money laundering
purposes. As a result, this would signiﬁcantly change the proﬁtability of money laundering
models that are now often used by criminals. In conclusion, these operational bitcoin
laundering services provide a hassle-free and mostly anonymized exchange of mixed coins
in an easy and consumer-friendly manner.
6. Discussion
Bitcoin has reportedly established itself as “a single common currency for cybercriminals
within the EU”. The virtual currency potentially provides the means to launder the obtained
proceeds without the strict requirements of (international) ﬁnancial institutions. This paper
aimed to examine in which ways cybercrime proceeds that are obtained in the form of
bitcoin or converted to bitcoin can be laundered. Following up on previous studies, we
focused in particular on money laundering services – both mixing as exchanging – offered
for bitcoin on the DarkWeb.
To examine bitcoin laundering, we used bitcoin mixing services and exchange services
and integrated these services in a working cash-out strategy. We examined the usability of
these services in a cash-out strategy by analysing the service-percentages and reputation-
mechanisms. This aided us in determining the likeliness of integration of these bitcoin
laundering services in an actual criminal scheme. We believe that in our experiment we have
shown that laundering cybercrime proceeds using bitcoin is a user-friendly and working
criminal service-model. However, it is not clear whether the model will work when larger
amounts of money are laundered. Yet, for smaller amounts it clearly offers an easy to use
and good value-for-money service, as long as criminals keep an eye out for scams.
We conclude that bitcoin money laundering is a practically conceivable concept and has
a high degree of likeness to be integrated in current-day and future money laundering
schemes. Recent cases and Europol reports support the conclusion that bitcoins are used for
money laundering by cybercriminals. Most notably, the ability to lower the cost of
laundering, whilst providing more anonymity, make it an interesting money laundering
technique for criminals.
This brings us to the following questions. First, the question arises what does this mean
for the proﬁtability of criminal business models. Obviously, we have a limited overview of
criminals actually using this very method. However, from this small-scale experiment, we do
know that at least in theory the cost of money laundering can be lowered using bitcoin. That
could make certain criminal business models potentially more proﬁtable, which is of course
attractive for the cybercriminal enterprise.
Second, the question arises how law enforcement should deal with this new money
laundering technique. The start and endpoint of bitcoin money laundering (often) includes
the exchange in currencies. Law enforcement authorities may be able to gather evidence at
these exchanges. Therein lies the possibility of intervening as current police measures
provide sufﬁcient means to do so, but future research is necessary to study this possibility to
its full extent. In addition, law enforcement authorities may be able to seize and analyse
bitcoin wallets of identiﬁed criminals to identify bitcoin addresses to trace back bitcoin
transfers.
Finally, the question remains on how bitcoin should be treated from a legal perspective.
Generally speaking, we can see that bitcoin is in a sort of twilight zone. In many states,
bitcoins are not banned, nor regulated. Because governments do not recognize bitcoin as a
currency, anti-money rules and regulations – such as “know your customer” (KYC) rules and
the reporting of suspicious transactions – do not apply for companies and institutions
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trading in bitcoin. Ironically, mainstream bitcoin exchanges, are lobbying to become
regulated[16]. When bitcoin will move out of the twilight zone and will end up regulated, we
cannot foresee. Current imagery of bitcoin as a criminal currency might lead to regulation of
bitcoin exchange services. However, that will not stop criminals in using bitcoin exchange
services that are located in jurisdictions that have no or less strict regulations. The degree to
which banning or regulating will have any effect on the facilitating role currently plays in
the criminal enterprise, has yet to be determined.
7. Future work
We identify three research questions that can be used for future research. These are as
follows:
RQ1. Howwidespread is the use of using bitcoin in a cash-out strategy?
We extensively reported on the precise workings of bitcoin mixers and exchange services in
a cash-out strategy for cybercrime proceeds. Concluding that the laundering of these
proceeds can be facilitated by the use of bitcoin and underground laundering services.
Consecutively, we concluded that this provides a challenge for law enforcement, as the
money trail becomes highly obfuscated. However, we do not know how widespread this
speciﬁc cash-out strategy is, and how big of a challenge law enforcement is actually facing.
Future research efforts could or should therefore also focus on the size, nature and impact of
these strategies.
RQ2. Which criminal business models (would) actually use this cash-out method?
Another step forward, follows-up on the question which criminal business models use this
cash-out method. Next to size, nature and impact, research efforts should focus on further
advancing the groundwork of “bitcoin money laundering” and seek to identify criminal
business models that could be using this cash-out method.
RQ3. What are the weak links in the strategy? Or in other terms, where to intervene?
The next step is to study how the results of the experiment in this paper, can be used to
create evidence-based intervention strategies for this type of cash-out strategies. We know
that certain elements of the tested cash-out strategy are less anonymous, technically feasible
to monitor or have the potential to be regulated. Following the previous section, not only
criminological or technical but also legal research into “exploiting” the weak links in the
tested cash-out strategy, will enable creating better countermeasures, including rules and
regulations, to combat the underlying business models.
Notes
1. See for more typologies on money laundering www.fatf-gaﬁ.com
2. However, some researchers suggest Tor users can be de-anonymised. See for instance
Chakravarty and Barbera (2014). See also Hardesty (2015).
3. Bitcoin mixing services are also called laundering, tumbling or cleaning services.
4. TNO Dark Web MoniTOR is an interactive tool designed for indexing and visualizing crawled
Dark Web data. See available at: dws.pm
5. Allowing us to use 0.5 or 1 BTC per service.
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6. In this paper, we have chosen not to disclose the names nor the onion addresses of both the
bitcoin mixers and the exchange services we used. As we are aware of the fact that these services
can be (easily) found, adding more context information on usability and working cash-out
schemes would have turned this paper into a user manual for bitcoin laundering, which is not our
intention. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you do have a scientiﬁc interest in the data used
in this paper.
7. The third criteria of “reputation in general” was determined by the analysis of open sources
about bitcoin laundering services.
8. As we did not have the opportunity of actually starting our money laundering scheme with real
crime proceeds – neither in bitcoin nor euros/dollars – we opted to use the research budget to
acquire the bitcoins to use in this experiment via a reputable bitcoin exchange – using the Dutch
Payment service iDeal.
9. Available at: http://numisight.com
10. See the report by UNODC (2014) for an overview of forensic techniques used in bitcoin money
laundering investigations.
11. Using the blockchain.info Web-based “taint analysis” comparing the receiving bitcoin addresses
in our Wallet Y with our “control address” in Wallet X.
12. Note that the platforms used, i.e. PayPal, are not oﬀering these types of services themselves and
should be seen as (relative) innocent bystander. However, it is known that Western Union is a
prominent element in money laundering typologies, as might be expected from its domination of
the legitimate ﬁnancial transfer market globally, see FATF (2010).
13. We described earlier our use of an exchange to buy the bitcoins used in this experiment. This
regular exchange we also used to exchange our mixed coins back to euros. This speciﬁc service
required us ﬁll out a form wherein we had to specify a bank account to which the funds upon
exchange should be transferred to. This in turn logically lowered the level of anonymity, as a
bank account of course leaves a trace to an actual person or company. But on the other hand, this
service did not charge us with a high commission for the use of this exchange service.
14. Figure 1 shows an example of accumulated reviews on a single platform, in this case for
gambling services. We have chosen not to show the actual accumulated reviews of the services
we used – to demonstrate the importance and accuracy of reviews – as this would neglect all
previous eﬀorts not do disclose the actual names of the tested services.
15. Available at: www.bitonic.nl
16. Available at: www.cnbc.com/2015/09/18/bitcoin-now-classed-as-a-commodity-in-the-us.html; available
at: www.cnbc.com/2015/02/25/bitcoin-futures-market-just-changed-the-game-commentary.html
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